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The Right of Counsel Today
Thile the right of the accused to be represented by counsel in a
criminal trial was not part of the English common law,1 the Federal
Constitution and many state constitutions contain provisions for this
right. These provisions have generally been construed, in the light of
the English background, as merely guaranteeing the opportunity to be
heard by counsel of his own choice if the accused is able to provide such
counsel.2 This construction of the constitutional provisions left unsolved
the problem of how far the state and federal governments were willing
to go in informing the defendant of his right to counsel and providing it
if necessary.
Shortly after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Congress, under the
authority of the Sixth Amendment, enacted a statute which required the
federal courts to assign counsel in capital cases.3 Thereafter, the states
-by statute, judicial decision, and constitutional provision-have pro-
vided counscl for defendants unable to obtain such services, until by 1931
the indigent and uninformed defendant was entitled to counsel in all
states in capital cases and in thirty-four states when under indictment
for a felony.4 In 1932 the United States Supreme Court, in Powell v.
Alabana,5 held that, under certain circumstances, the denial of the right
of counsel would constitute a violation of due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In 1938 the first rule guaranteeing the right of
counsel in all federal cases was laid down in Johnson v. Zerbst;6 this
was subsequently codified in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
7
Although establishing a definite rule for the federal courts, the Supreme
Court, in dealing with the right of counsel in the state courts, preferred
to adopt an approach, reviewed and summarized in Bute v. Iilinois,8
necessitating the decision of each case on its individual facts. By adopting
such an approach, the Court has left open an area within which an
1 The right to be represented by counsel was first recognized in England in the
Trials for Felonies Act (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114) in 1836. For a history of the common
law development see Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law, (2nd ed.)
(1936) 385-386.
2 For the early American Constitutional doctrines on provisions for the right of
counsel see 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed., Carrington) (1927) 696-708.
See also Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466 (1941).
3 1 Stat. 118 (1790), 18 USCA § 563 (1927).
4 Nat'l. Comm. on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Prosecution 4
(1931).
5 287 U.S. 46 (1932).
6 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
7 Rule 44: "Assignment of Counsel. If the defendant appears in court without
a counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to
represent him at every stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed without
counsel or is able to obtain counsel.' '-18 USCA (Supp. 1946) following § 687.
8 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
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indigent defendant, uninformed of his rights to counsel, is not deprived
of his federal constitutional rights when convicted and sentenced in a
state court without the presence of counsel; within that area the question
of further protection is left to the states. In an attempt to provide pro-
tection within that area, the Illinois Supreme Court, in the June term
of 1948, adopted Rule of Practice and Procedure 27A 9 in order to give
greater effectiveness to the statutory provision of counsel -which has
existed in that state since 1871.10
From these historical facts it is apparent that the question of whether
or not a court is under a duty to inform a defendant of his right to
counsel and supply one where necessary is one which has only recently
arisen in the courts. Its importance, in terms of providing protection on
an essentially equal basis to all citizens regardless of economic status or
educational level, is obvious. From the variety of answers presented, the
inference is clear that there is no predominating consensus of opinion as
to the most desirable solution.
Federal Court Procedure
The divergence in the federal constitutional rules applicable to the
federal and state courts has its origin in the fact that the federal courts
are governed by the Sixth Amendment, which specifically provides for
the right of counsel, while the state courts are governed only by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The right of indigent
defendants who are charged with felonies to be informed that they would
be assigned counsel upon request was first recognized as existing in the
federal courts in 1938 in Johnson v. Zer1st."1 In that case the Court held
that under the provisions of the Sixth Amendment, either the presence
of counsel or an intelligent waiver thereof was required in the federal
courts, and the presiding judge was under the duty of informing all
felony defendants of this right. What constituted an intelligent waiver
was to be determined in the light of the facts in each case, and the pre-
sumption against the waiver of a constitutional right was to be employed
in the absence of an affirmative showing of a valid waiver. Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure Number 44, adopted in 1946, consolidated the
holding of this case and the previous statutes into a general rule appli-
cable in the federal district courts.' 2
Constitution&i Protection in State Courts
The protection of the uninformed and indigent defendants' right to
counsel in state courts under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
9 Illinois Supreme Court. Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 27A, 400 I.-
(1948). See note 46, infra, for text.
10 Ill. Rev. Stats. (1947) c. 38, § 730. See 42, infra, for text.
11 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See Holtzoff, Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amend-
ment (1944) 20 N.Y.L.Q. Rev. 1, for a general discussion of the history and effect of
the rule. Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275 (1941) impliedly held that a plea of guilty
should not be deemed a waiver of counsel, and Evans v. Rice, 126 F. (2d) 633, 637
(App. D.C. 1942) held that Johnson v. Zerbst applied to convictions upon a plea of
guilty. Von Molke v. Giles, 332 U.S. 708 (1948) (German spy acting without the
advice or knowing waiver of counsel pleaded guilty in a prosecution under the
Espionage Act at the suggestion of an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation)
applies this rule to an intelligent defendant, financially capable of providing counsel,
but merely ignorant of her rights.
12 See note 7, supra, for text.
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Amendment 13 was recently reviewed by the court in Bute v. Illinois,14 in
which the defendant was prosecuted for the crime of indecent liberties.
The petitioner contended that the Illinois trial court was under an affirm-
ative duty to inquire into his desire for the services of counsel and his
ability to procure them, and that the lack of a showing of such inquiry
on the common law record created a presumption of a violation of due
process. The Court held that the lack of such an entry did not create
such a presumption, but decided the case on the grounds that, assuming
the truth of his allegation that the Court had not informed him of his
right to counsel, the petitioner was not entitled to counsel as a matter of
constitutional right in the absence of aggravating circumstances.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court rejected the view, expressed
by Mr. Justice Black in his dissents in Adamson v. California15 and
Foster v. Illinois1 6 that the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment
made the provisions of the first eight amendments applicable to the state
governments as well as to the Federal Government. In this manner the
Court avoided the application of the rigid requirements of Johnson v.
Zerbst17 to the state courts, and adopted a broad test of a violation of
due process laid down in Hebert v. Louisiana'8 and developed in Palko v.
Connecticut.19 The Hebert and Palko cases established the principle that-
in matters of criminal procedure in state courts the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects the defendant against the abuses that "conflict with the
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the basis of our
civil and political institutions."'20 This test has enabled the Court to
13 The applicable portion of the Fourteenth Amendment is the due process clause
rather than the privileges and immunities clause. See Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 51 (1947) for an extended discussion of the scope of this clause. It applies
only to the privileges and immunities stemming from United States, as opposed to
state, citizenship. Neither is the provision of counsel a problem of equal protection
despite the economic overtones. See Carr v. Lanagan, 50 F. Supp. 41 (D.C. Mass.
1943) (Statutory imposition of three dollar filing fee for petition for writ of error
with no provision for proceedings forma pauperis held not violative of the equal pro-
tection clause). In this case the court rejects the argument of economic discrimina-
tion, and holds that the classification is reasonable. Traditionally the equal protection
clause in criminal procedure has largely been limited to problems of discrimination
and classification. For examples of this use see: Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1880) (trial of a negro where the state statute governing jury eligibility
excluded negroes). Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) (exclusion of negroes from
grand juries).
14 333 U.S. 640 (1948), affirming, People v. Bute, 396 Ill. 588, 72 N.E. (2d) 813
(1947) (petitioner convicted of taking indecent liberties with a child).
15 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947), in which Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, made an
extended historical argument to sustain the position that the Fourteenth Amendment
made the provisions of the first eight Amendments applicable to the states.
16 332 U.S. 134 (1947), in which Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, took the position
that his dissent in the Adamson case, ibid, was applicable to a deprivation of the
right of counsel. This position would impose the mandatory Federal Rule, which
has its origin in the Sixth Amendment, upon the state courts.
17 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
18 272 U.S. 312 (1926).
19 302 U.S. 312 (1937).
20 Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926). In Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 312, 325-328 (1937) Mr. Justice Cardozo adopted this test as a peg on which
to hang his analysis of what does and does not constitute a violation of due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The subsequent Court decisions have followed
Mr. Justice Cardozo's technique in dealing with the right of counsel, and usually
begin by citing these two cases as containing the controlling principles. It is inter-
esting to notice, however, that in developing the test, the Justice laid down certain
rights which the states could not abridge, and among them was the right of counsel.
[Vol. 39344
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approach the facts of each case independently, deciding it in terms of
whether or not the demands of common fairness were defeated by the
lack of counsel.2 1 With this test the lack of counsel alone has not con-
stituted a deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
A finding of a violation of the requirements of due process has depended
on the presence of additional factors. Since the decision of Powell v.
Alabama22 in 1932, there are two groups of cases, all decided by a divided
court, in which the result has depended on whether or not the deprivation
of counsel was accompanied by other factors.
In Powell v. Alabama, nine young, illiterate, non-resident negroes were
arraigned, tried and sentenced to death in one day without the benefit of
counsel. The Court held that because of the fact that time was not
allowed to procure counsel and the petitioners were incapable of defend-
ing themselves, the failure of the trial court to assign counsel constituted
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has subsequently
held that the following factors, coupled with the failure of a trial court
to assign counsel, constitute denial of due process: trickery by state
officials, lack of education, 23 youth and inexperience, 24 technical diffi-
culties of possible defenses, 25 precipitancy in the proceedings while hold-
ing the defendant incommunicado,2 6 and carelessness and misinforma-
tion on the part of the trial judge.2 7
See Bute v. People of Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 656 (1948). For discussions of the
Palko ease see Note (1938) 28 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 919; Note (1938) 51 Harv.
L. Rev. 739; Note (1938) 27 Ill. B. J. 102; Note (1938) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 550; Note
(1938) 15 N.Y.L.Q. Rev. 442; Note (1938) Yale L. J. 489.
21 The test of ultimate decency is explicitly advanced by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
concurring, in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59, 61 (1947). For general dis-
cussions of the Adamson case see Note (1947) J. Crim. L. & Criminology 379; Note
(1948) A.B.A.J. 19; Note (1948) 46 Mich. L. Rev. 372; Note (1947) 21 So. Calif.
L. Rev. 47; Note (1947) 33 W. Va. L. Rev. 642.
22 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The trial court actually made a farce of the duty to
provide counsel by refusing to appoint specific counsel, and designating all the
members of the county bar, at large, to act as counsel for the defendants until
competent counsel should appear. See Note (1933) 23 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
841; Note (1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 245; Note (1933) 8 Notre Dame Law 260; Note
(1933) 17 Mich. L. Rev. 415; Note (1933) 10 N.Y.L.Q. Rev. 389.
23 Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941) (defendant arrested for burglary and
pleaded guilty under the assurance of a light sentence and received twenty years;
he had no knowledge of legal procedure, no previous knowledge of the charges, and
was refused permission to withdraw his plea and obtain counsel). See Note (1941)
20 Neb. L. Rev. 173.
24Wade v. M.ayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948) (sixteen year old boy held incapable of
defending himself on charge of breaking and entering because of youth). DeMeerleer
v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947) (seventeen year old boy arraigned, convicted and
sentenced for first degree murder without assistance of counsel).
25 Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945) (refusal of counsel on a charge of
armed robbery with a deadly weapon). The court held that even if the petitioner
had committed.the offense, determination of the degree, of which several were pro-
vided by the statute, required the services of trained counsel. Tompkins v. Missouri,
323 U.S. 485 (1945) (companion ease to Williams v. Kaiser involving t charge of
first degree murder). Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 787 (1945) (conviction of an unedu-
cated Indian in the state courts without the advice of counsel reversed on the grounds
that a possible defense of Federal jurisdiction existed to the charge since the
burglary was committed on in Indian Reservation). For discussion of the Tompkins
and Williams cases see: Note (1945) 33 Geo. L.J. 495; Note (1945) 44 Mich. L.
Rev. 489.
26 Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945) (petitioner held incommunicado until
arraignment and refused a continuance to consult counsel).
27 Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (transcript of the trial court's ques-
tioning of the defendant showed that the court was misinformed as to the defend-
1948]
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In Betts v. Brady,28- the Court, while stating that the denial of counsel
by state courts in a capital case was unconstitutional, held that the denial
of counsel to a defendant who had requested that counsel be assigned to
defend him on a robbery charge, where the trial was before the court
without a jury, and the only issue was the veracity of the witnesses, did
not constitute a contravention of the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment. More recently the Court has made it clear that severity of
sentence alone, in a non-capital case, does not constitute a sufficient addi-
tional circumstance to amount to a denial of due process.
2 9
In view of these decisions, the Court in the Bute case pointed out that
while in a capital case a denial of counsel was a contravention of due
process, in a non-capital case the deprivation of counsel as a violation of
due process depended on the fact situation of the particular case.30 In
support of its opinion, Mr. Justice Burton, speaking for the Court, argued
that while any decision made under the Fourteenth Amendment would
govern despite the presence of less stringent requirements in the state
constitutions, it did not feel justified in imposing an inflexible rule
arbitrarily upon the states when it had only recently recognized such a
requirement in the federal courts. The Court also pointed to the fact
that the right to be provided with counsel in federal courts stemmed from
the Sixth Amendment rather than the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment so that the Court did not even have a verbal similarity on
which to rest a requirement of the same standard for state procedure in
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' To do so, claimed
the Court, would be to disregard the area of state autonomy, and to
"introduce extraordinary confusion and uncertainty into state criminal
procedure where clarity and certainty are essential." ' 32 Underlying this
reasoning is probably a fear that a retroactive decision on Constitutional
grounds would result in a mass exodus of hardened criminals who could
not be retried because of a lack of evidence as well as an apprehension
as to the strain which such retrials would place on the capacity of the
state judicial systems.
33
ant's previous record and conducted its examination in a facetious manner). But of.
Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948), distinguishable from Townsend v. Burke in
that the only allegation was the severity of a sentence under the habitual criminal
act was unconstitutional because the court had acted under the misapprehension
that the sentence was mandatory. The Court stated that, in the absence of other
considerations, the severity of the sentence imposed was not grounds for the allega-
tion of a violation of due process. But see Mr. Justice Rutledge's dissent in this
case for a criticism of the distinction between the two cases.
28 316 U.S. 455 (1941). For a discussion of the case see: Note (1943) A.B.A.J.
61; Note (1942) 21 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 107; Note (1942) 42 Col. L. Rev. 1205; Note
(1942) 17 Tul. L. Rev. 306; Note (1942) 91 U. Pa. L. Rev. 78.
29 Gryger v. Burke, cited supra note 27.
30 See Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173, 179 (1946). Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in
dicta, points out that the court requires additional circumstances combined with the
lack of counsel to constitute a violation of due process such as "racial handicap of
the defendant, his mental incapacity, his inability to make an intelligent choice, and
a precipitancy in the acceptance of a plea of guilty."
31 U.S. Const., Amendment VI, provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
32 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 668 (1948).
33 This point is explicitly made by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, see Foster v. U.S.,
332 U.S. 134, 139 (1947). But see the position taken by Mr. Justice Black (dis-
senting) in the same case at 140 where he states that this consideration is irrelevant
in determining whether or not to apply the Bill of Rights.
[Vol. 39
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The dissent in Bute v. Illinwis34 is typical of the position which four of
the Justices of the present Court have taken in the right of counsel cases.
In addition to the broad grounds of Mr. Justice Black's position in
Adamson v. California,35 Mr. Justice Douglas rested his dissent on the
position that irrespective of the fact that the Sixth Amendment is not
applied to the states by force of the Fourteenth Amendment, the right
of counsel is one of the fundamental and basic rights which is guaranteed
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and cannot be
abridged. But, as a third objection to the majority opinion, the dissent
contends that, even if the need for counsel is the proper test, that need
should be measured by the nature of the charge and the ability of the
average man to defend himself against it without the aid of an expert in
the law rather than by the complexities of the particular case and the
lack of ability of the particular defendant, which is the criterion set up
by the majority. In short, the dissent would measure the need for counsel
in terms of the need of a "reasonable man," as opposed to the need of
the actual defendant in each case. This would of course enable a court
to rule on specific offenses and defenses rather than adhering strictly
to an evaluation of the net impression created by all the factors in each
case.
If it is admitted that it is difficult to support the distinction between
capital and non-capital cases on rational grounds, the question then
becomes whether the present view on capital cases should be extended to
cover all cases which carry a penalty of imprisonment in the penitentiary,
or whether the present rule is sufficiently protective in that the right of
counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment should exist only where the
defendant is placed at a disadvantage because of his particular situation,
which could have been corrected by the presence of counsel. The best
argument in favor of the present position is that it offers the decided
advantage of preventing the exodus of criminals which would follow a
decision recognizing the right in all felony cases while permitting the
court to correct the more flagrant abuses. Under the rule of the Bute
case it will be possible for the Court to narrow gradually the area in
which the denial of the right of counsel is not a violation of due process
through an accumulation of decisions recognizing additional factors
which, coupled with the lack of counsel, constitute a denial of due
process.
Provision of Counsel by the States
The Court's refusal to proclaim an absolute constitutional right has
left to the states the initiative in supplying additional protection to the
uninformed and indigent defendant. For the most part the states have
recognized that additional protection is needed to give the indigent and
uninformed defendant an equal opportunity before the criminal bench,
and have provided for the assignment of counsel in varying situations
by statute, constitutional provision, or judicial decision. 36 In construing
84 333 U.S. 640, 677 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
35 332 U.S. 46 (1947), cited supra, note 14.
36 The provision of counsel to defendants on request in non-capital cases is required
by statute in Arkansas, California, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming. It is required by judicial decision in Connecticut, Florida, Indiana,
1948]
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these provisions the state courts have adopted a wide variety of tech-
niques. Some states have held that there is an affirmative duty on the
trial court to inform the defendant that he has a right to counsel and that
counsel will be furnished if he so desires. A failure to appoint counsel,
unless waived, constitutes a loss of jurisdiction by the court in some of
these decisions 37 Other states limit the duty to furnish counsel to capital
cases only.
3 8
Many of the states place no affirmative duty on the court to inform the
defendant in a non-capital case, but provide counsel when it is requested
by the defendant. 39 Assignment of counsel has also been held to rest
within the trial court's discretion.40 Where the right has been guaran-
teed by legislative or constitutional provision, some courts have tended
to employ procedural devices and judicial interpretation to limit its
effectiveness. 4 ' From this brief survey it can be deduced that the right
of the indigent and uninformed defendant to be assigned counsel has not
been uniformly recognized by the states, and that where it has been rec-
ognized, the courts have in some instances tended to limit its efficacy.
Provision of Counsel in Illinois
The history of the right of counsel in Illinois presents an instance in
which all of the techniques noted above have been used in limiting the
right. Recently, however, Illinois has recognized that this right was one
-which in all fairness required more adequate protection; and despite the
holding in Bute v. Illinois that its procedure intrinsically satisfied the
minimum requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Illinois
Michigan, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. It is guaranteed
by constitutional provisions in Georgia and Kentucky, but has been affirmatively
rejected by courts in Maryland and Texas, and by dicta in Alabama and Mississippi.
See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 470 (1941).
37 Wiley v. Hudspeth, 162 Kan. 516, 178 P. (2d) 246 (1947) (seventeen year old
boy sentenced on plea of guilty to the charge of burglary with no journal entry as
to the presence of counsel) ; In re Connor, 15 Cal. (2d) 161, 99 P. (2d) 804 (1940) ;
People v. Miller, 123 Cal. App. 499, 11 P. (2d) 994 (1932); Note (1942) 15 So. Cal.
L. Rev. 242; Richardson v. State, 61 Okla. Cr. 278, 67 P. (2d) 804 (1937) (defendant
pleaded guilty to a charge of robbery); Knox County Council v. State ex rel. Mc-
Cormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E. (2d) 405 (1940) (in a suit by an attorney to collect
a fee for defending a pauper the Indiana Court, in passing on the power to appoint
counsel, held that the Indiana Constitution imposes a duty on the court to appoint
counsel and that failure to do so constitutes a loss of jurisdiction).
38 Johnson v. Mayo, 158 Fla. 264, 28 So. (2d) 585 (1947) (defendant requested
counsel on a charge of larceny and was informed that the court was without power
to grant it); Thomas v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. 549, 106 S.W. (2d) 289 (1937)
(assault to rob) ; Gilchrist v. State, 27 Ala. App. 401, 173 So. 649 (1937) (second
degree burglary) (in this case the court held that the right existed only in a capital
case where the inability to provide counsel was made known to the trial court, but
suggested that the court had discretionary power to appoint counsel which should be
exercised in felony cases).
39 Mackey v. Kaiser, __._Mo.., 187 S.W. (2d) 198 (1945) (defendant waived
counsel and pleaded guilty; court indicated, however, that there is a requirement of
full knowledge of the consequences of a waiver by plea of guilty as a result of
Williams v. Kaiser, 326 U.S. 471 (1945)); Commonwealth ex rel Stengel v. Burke,
158 Pa. Super. 87, 42 A. (2d) 921 (1945) ; People v. Fries, 294 Mich. 382, 293 N.W.
689 (1940); State v. Blakenship, 186 La. 238, 172 So. 4 (1937).
40 Williams v. State, 143 Fla. 826, 197 So. 562 (1940).
41 See Moore v. Commonwealth, 298 Ky. 14, 181 S.W. (2d) 413 (1944); Hlamlin
v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 22, 152 S.W. (2d) 297 (1941) ; Holton v. State, 143 Tex.
Cr. 415, 158 S.W. (2d) 772 (1942) for examples of this type of limitation.
[Vol. 39
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Supreme Court created a rule of court providing additional safeguards
for the indigent and uninformed defendant.
The original Illinois position regarding the right to counsel was incor-
porated in a statute enacted March 27, 1874 which provided that every
person charged with a felony shall be allowed counsel if he states on oath
that he is unable to procure counsel.42 In its review of denial of rights
under this statute, the Illinois Supreme Court limited the right to
counsel by various interpretations and presumptions which were recently
approved in the Bute case. 43 The Illinois Court had consistently taken
the position that the right to counsel under this statute does not arise
until the defendant, of his own initiative, requests counsel of the court
and files an affidavit stating that because of indigeney or other reasons
he is unable to procure counsel. Under this construction, in order to
constitute an error on the part of the court, it must appear on the record
that the defendant took these affirmative steps to procure counsel and,
except where other circumstances are present which constitute a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, no duty arises on the part of the court
to provide counsel or to inform the defendant of his right to counsel until
such action is initiated by the defendant. 44 Expressing its rationale of
the rule, the court in People v. WTlson 45 explained that the difference
between the Illinois and federal rules is that the latter starts from the
assumption that the defendant does not k-now of his rights while the
Illinois court begins with the well grounded legal maxim that everyone
is presumed to know the law. The advisability of this maxim in such a
fundamental situation, particularly where knowledge of the right to
counsel, if present, would not add to the knowledge of prohibited
behavior under criminal law, is decidedly questionable. It is unrealistic
to assume that anyone without considerable experience in criminal pro-
cedure would be able to determine the steps necessary to comply with the
statute and invoke the right which it provides.
The recently announced Illinois Supreme Court rule provides that in
the absence of counsel the trial court shall advise the defendant of his
right to be defended by counsel before any plea to the indictment can
be entered, allowed, or changed.46 The rule further makes it mandatory
42 Ill. Rev. Stats. (1947) c. 38, §730: "Every person charged with a crime shall
be allowed counsel, and when he shall state upon oath that he is unable to procure
counsel, the court shall assign him competent counsel."
43 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 672 (1948).
44 People v. Wilson, 399 Ill. 437, 78 N.E. (2d) 512 (1948); People v. Bute, 396
fl1. 588, 72 N.E. (2d) 813 (1947); People v. Davis, 396 Ill. 432, 72 N.E. (2d) 193
(1947); People v. Creviston, 396 Ill. 78, 71 N.E. (2d) 205 (1947); People v. Corrie,
387 1l. 587, 56 N.E. (2d) 767 (1944); People v. Corbett, 387 Ill. 41, 55 N.E. (2d)
74 (1944). But under a similar requirement, the Louisiana Court in State v. Blanken-
ship, 186 La. 238, 172 So. 4 (1937), held that while the defendant must request
counsel, once he has done so it becomes the duty of the trial court to assist him in
preparing the necessary proof of indigency.
45 399 111. 437, 78 N.E. (2d) 512 (1948).
46 Illinois Supreme Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 27A. 400 1l.-
(1948): "In all criminal cases wherein the accused upon conviction shall, or may,
be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary, if, at the time of his arraignment,
the accused is not repr~sented by counsel, the court shall, before receiving, entering,
or allowing the change of any plea to an indictment, advise the accused he has a
right to be defended by counsel. If he desires counsel and states under oath he is
unable to employ such counsel, the court shall appoint competent counsel to represent
him. The court shall not permit waiver of counsel, or a plea of guilty, by any person
accused of a crime for which upon conviction, the punishment shall be imprisonment
1948]
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to appoint counsel where the defendant is under eighteen years of age,
or where the defendant is, in the opinion of the court, incapable of
understanding the nature of the charges, his right to counsel, and the
consequences of his being found guilty. The only issue left open for
judicial determination under the rule is the standard of understanding
necessary to constitute a valid waiver of counsel. It can be said, there-
fore, that the effect of the new rule will be to abrogate most of the case
law interpreting the right of counsel under this statute, and to cause the
trial courts to provide counsel for every defendant charged with a felony
(i. e., a penitentiary offense), without the initiation of any action on the
part of the defendant himself.
The final test of the effectiveness of the guarantee of the right of
counsel lies in the availability of judicial review of its denial; by requir-
ing the inclusion of the questioning of the defendant in the common law
record, Rule 27A will apparently settle the problem of the proper remedy
for review of denial of the right of counsel in Illinois courts. The problem
was recently highlighted by a concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge
in Marino v. Ragen,47 in which he expressed doubt whether any remedy
whatsoever existed to raise the issue in Illinois.
Recent surveys of the work of the Illinois Supreme Court have pointed
out the fact that the existence of three remedies for error in criminal
cases-habeas corpus, motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis,
and writ of error-caused an endless procession of appeals in which most
were dismissed on procedural grounds without going to the merits of the
case. Such dismissal had the general result of blocking relief in federal
courts because of the exhaustion of remedies rule,48 and of preventing
in the penitentiary, unless the court finds from proceedings bad in open court that
the accused understands the nature of the charges against him, and the consequences
thereof if found guilty, and understands that he has a right to counsel and under-
standingly waives such right. The inquiries of the court and the answers of the
defendant to determine whether the accused understands his rights to be represented
by counsel, and comprehends the natureof the crime with which he is charged, and
the punishment thereof fixed by law, shall be recited in, and become a part of the
common law iecord in the case; provided in no case shall a plea of guilty be received
or accepted from a minor under the age of eighteen years unless represented by
counsel. "1
47 332 U.S. 561, 564 (1947) (an Italian who had been in the country two years
and who allegedly could not understand the English language pleaded guilty to
murder; the arresting officer acted as interpreter). While this case was dismissed
on a confession of error by the Attorney General of Illinois, Mr. Justice Rutledge,
in a concurring opinion, strongly castigated the Illinois procedure, saying, at foot-
note 9, "It is questionable whether Illinois offers a remedy for a man deprived of
his right to counsel . . . The trial judge would surely know that he had refused to
appoint counsel, and would be presumed to be familiar with the record . . . hence
coram nobis would not lie. Assuming that the clerk makes the routine entry to the
effect that the defendant was apprised of his rights which he promptly waived ...
writ of error would afford inadequate review. Only if the Attorney General's view
of habeas corpus would extend to such a case would there be a remedy available. I '
48 Before the Federal Courts can entertain a petition for habeas corpus to obtain
relief from a conviction in a state court where a question of Federal right is involved,
the petitioner must exhaust his state remedies, including all appeals to the state
supreme court and appeals and writs of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. The federal court will only hear a petition where the same issues were pre-
viously presented in the state system and no substantial relief existed for the viola-
tion of a Federal right in the state courts. Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1943).
But during the last term the Court, in Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948), held
that it was not necessary for petitions for certiorari or appeals to be filed in the
United States Supreme Court from the decisions of the state courts to satisfy the
rule. It also held that, where more than one remedy had been established by decision
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review by the United States Supreme Court on certiorari in many cases
because the denial of relief was on the non-federal grounds of a pro-
cedural deficiency. 49 The procedural problem then becomes one of deter-
mining the defects in these three remedies, and then determining whether
or not Rule 27A cures those defects.
It has previously been held that habeas corpus will not lie for a denial
of the right of the accused to be assigned counsel under Illinois pro-
cedure.50 However, in Marino v. Ragen5 ' and Loftus v. Illinois5 2 the
Attorney General of Illinois has argued otherwise, and a second opinion
in the latter case supports this contention. The fact that the trial judge
would be presumed to know whether or not the prisoner asserted his
right of counsel or waived it precludes the use of the motion in the nature
of writ of error coram twbis which lies for error of fact, not law.53
of the state courts for the deprivation alleged, exhaustion of one remedy was all
that was necessary to satisfy the rule. But the new Judicial Code, Pub. L. No. 773,
80th Cong., 2d. Sess. (June 25, 1948) §2254, enacts the law as stated in Ex parte
Hawk without the subsequent modifications of Wade v. Mayo. See Note (1948) 61
Harv. L. Rev. 657, 664 for discussion of habeas corpus in the federal courts; note
(1948) 39 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 357.
49 For a general discussion of the problem of collateral relief in Illinois see:
Comment (1947) 38 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 139; reprinted as Comment (1947)
42 fI. L. Rev. 329; Comment (1947) 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 107, 119-123.
50 People ez rel. Thompson v. Neirstheimer, 395 Ill. 572, 71 N.E. (2d) 343 (1947).
In the face of allegations of facts which if proved might have amounted to a viola-
tion of due process, the court held that habeas corpus can not take the place of
writ of error and is only proper for questioning the jurisdiction of the court. This
position was taken as against the argument that failure to assign counsel constituted
a loss of jurisdiction. People ex rel. Swolley v. Ragen, 390 Ill. 106, 61 N.E. (2d)
248 (1944) ; People ex rel. Barrett v. Bradley, 291 Ill. 169, 62 N.E. (2d) 788 (1945).
51 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
52 334 U.S. 804 (1948). This case was held in abeyance pending clarification of
Illinois procedure. The Attorney General of Illinois argued on the basis of dicta in
People v. Shoffner, 400 Ill. 337, 79 N.E. (2d) 200 (1948) and People v. Wilson, 399
Ill. 437, 78 N.E. (2d) 512 (1948) that habeas corpus was the proper remedy. In
-People v. Shoffner, the court said by way of dicta, "Reference should be made to
the plaintiff in error's affidavit for it furnishes an opportunity to again emphasize
the distinction plainly drawn between the questions reviewable on a writ of error
and the questions of fact that may be tried on a petition for habeas corpus where it
is claimed that due process has been denied . . . (the opinion cites facts analogous
to Powell v. Alabama) . . . The Supreme Court of the United States held that such
averments, if proved, were within the doctrine of Powell v. Alabama and, being
such, required an answer . . . 1 The Attorney General also argued that habeas
corpus was the proper remedy in Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947). But in
White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945) he argued that the Illinois Supreme Court will
not review issues of fact on an original application for a writ of habeas corpus. In
a subsequent opinion in the same case, People v. Loftus, 400 fll. 432, 81 N.E. (2d)
-(1948), the Illinois Supreme Court took the position that habeas corpus would
lie for review of void convictions. Further in the per curiam opinion the court stated
that the United States Supreme Court had held that under certain circumstances a
denial of counsel voided the conviction on due process grounds. It required, however,
that the original petition must allege facts which bring the case within the doctrine
of Powell v. Alabama. The dicta in the Shoffner case is rather tenuous, and, despite
the strong inference that habeas corpus would lie for failure to provide counsel, it
seems that a direct ruling on the problem would be necessary to overcome the force
of the previous holdings, cited supra, note 50. See "Open Letter to the Attorney
General of Illinois" by Dean Wilbur G. Katz in 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 251 (1948)
for an account of the vacillations of that official on this point.
53 The motion in the nature of writ of error coram nobis is the Illinois statutory
substitute for the common law writ and bears a five year limitation. Ill Rev. Stats.
(1947) c. 110, §196. This motion only brings before the court facts, not of record
and unknown to the court at the time of trial which would have barred the convic-
tion, provided that the defendant has not been negligent in not informing the court
1948]
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Elimination of these remedies leaves only the writ of error which lies
for review of the trial court record and would appear to be the proper
remedy. While it has a twenty year statutory limitation, this writ is
hedged about with certain procedural difficulties: the defendant is only
entitled to the common law record of his trial and conviction on appeal54
and in the absence of a bill of exceptions, prepared at the defendant's
own expense55 and certified by the trial judge within fifty days after
conviction,5 6 the Illinois Supreme Court has consistently held that it is
limited to matters contained in the common law record.57 Most cases
therefore come up for review on the common law record only.58
Moreover, in determining the due process issue on appeal from a deci-
sion rendered on such a record, the United States Supreme Court has
held that it was bound by the common law record which was before the
state court, and that it is not necessary that an affirmative recital of an
explanation of the right of counsel by the trial court be recited in the
record.5 9 The common law record imports verity and, in the absence of
any proof to the contrary by another matter of record, it is presumed
that the court fully discharged all of its duties toward the defendant.
60
That record ordinarily contains no facts whatsoever concerning the
deprivation of the right to counsel, and, in the absence of such facts, the
presumption of verity makes the appeal a mere formality.
61
Rule 27A, however, is designed to supply an effective remedy by in-
corporating a transcript of the court's questioning of the defendant in
a felony prosecution on his desire for counsel into the common law
record. With that information available, review on writ of error would
go to the merits of the claim of deprivation rather than being a purely
formal proceeding, necessary only to exhaust the state remedies and go
into the Federal courts. It will also incorporate into the common law
record sufficient information to make the process of review by the United
States Supreme Court on due process grounds easier.
of these facts at the time of the trial. Sims v. People, 399 fI1. 159, 77 N.E. (2d)
173 (1948); People v. Rave, 392 Ill. 435, 65 N. E. (2d) 23 (1946); People ex rel.
Courtney v. Green, 355 Ill. 468, 189 N.E. 500 (1934); People v. Dysch, 311 fI1. 342,
143 N.E. 100 (1924). For discussions concerning this motion see Comment (1937)
31 Ill. L. Rev. 646; Comment (1947) 38 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 139, 140-143;
also printed (1947) 42 ll. L. Rev. 329, 330-334.
54 Illinois Supreme Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 36, Ill. Rev. Stats.
(1947) c. 110 §259.36.
55 Ill. Rev. Stats. (1947) c. 53, §81.
56 Illinois Supreme Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 70A, Ill. Rev.
Stats. (1947) c. 110, §259.70A.
57 People v. Shoffner, 400 Ill. 337, 79 N.E. (2d) 200 (1948); People v. Berry,
399 fI1. 17, 76 N.E. (2d) 433 (1947); People v. Bolds, 398 ll. 626, 76 N.E. (2d)
456 (1947); People v. Nelson, 398 ll. 623, 76 N.E. (2d) 441 (1947).
58 Comment (1947) 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 107, 125.
59 Foster v. People of Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S.
173 (1946).
60 People v. Shoffner, 400 Ill. 337, 79 N.E. (2d) 200 (1948); People v. Owens,
397 Ill. 166, 73 N.E. (2d) 274 (1947); People v. Fuhs, 390 Ill. 67, 60 N.E. (2d)
205 (1946); People v. Pacora, 358 Ill. 448, 193 N.E. 477 (1935).
61 The evils of this situation are apparent from a consideration of Carter v.
Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946), in which a majority of the Court held that since they
were limited to the common law record, they were confronted with no factors which,
in addition to the denial of the right of counsel, constituted a violation of due
process. Actually, as Mr. Justice Murphy pointed out in his dissent, the facts of




The effect of this rule has been substantially to incorporate the Federal
rule, as expressed in Johnson v. Zerbst, into the Illinois Rules of Practice
and Procedure. A possible mechanical improvement might be to provide
for the assignment of counsel at the preliminary hearing as is the Eng-
lish practice.62 This has the advantage of having counsel on the case
during the pre-trial period and avoiding the delay caused by a continu-
ance when counsel is appointed on arraignment.
The remaining problem is the construction which the Illinois Supreme
Court will place on the requirement of the rule that the waiver of counsel
shall be valid only if the accused understands the nature of the right to
counsel, the nature of the crime with which he is charged, and the con-
sequences of conviction. Because of the great similarity between the
Illinois and Federal rules, it seems probable that the court will be guided
by Johnson v. Zerbst. The minimum to be expected is a series of decisions
conforming to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
follows from the fact that incorporation of the examination of the de-
fendant into the common law record will make the facts available to
the United States Supreme Court so that it can determine the issue on
its merits.
Conclusion
Bute v. Illinois indicates that, within the foreseeable future, the
United States Supreme Court does not intend to interpret the Constitu-
tion as imposing a mandatory requirement of counsel in all felony cases
in the state courts. A survey of the state provisions for the protection of
the indigent defendants who are uninformed as regards the right to
counsel shows that even where the right is recognized, the tendency of the
courts has been to limit its effectiveness by various devices.
Illinois Rule 27A represents one attempt to deal with the problem
created by these limitations. Its advantages are twofold: (1) its status
as a rule of court makes easier the process of amendment to correct
defects which may subsequently appear in its operation; (2) its prospec-
tive operation avoids the problem of retroactivity previously discussed
which would be created by invoking such a-rule as a constitutional right.
Mechanically, therefore, the new Illinois rule represents an excellent
solution to the problem of the protection of the indigent and uninformed
defendant's right of counsel. The only problem remaining to be solved
is the construction of the standards of trial court procedure which will
satisfy the requirements for an intelligent waiver of the right of counsel.
In the construction of these standards lies the answer to the extent of




62 Under the Poor Prisoners Defense Act, 1930 (20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 32) the right
to counsel is absolute in cases of murder and placed at the discretion of the com-
mitting magistrate or the trial court in all other cases. It further provides that
the justice may satisfy himself by ordinary means as to the accused's ability to
pay for counsel in the litigation then pending. This feature of gauging the ability
to pay by the costs of defending the particular action also differs from the usual
American practice.
63 A collateral problem, far beyond the scope of the present discussion, is the
quality of the counsel provided for the indigent defendants and the compensation
of such counsel. See the Report of the Nat'l. Comm. on Law Observance and En-
forcement, Report on Prosecution, 27-84 (1941) for a general survey of this situation.
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